Philosopher Phillip Hübl gives a lecture on the ‘moral spectacle’
In Darmstadt, the philosopher and bestselling author Philipp Hübl analysed the so-called ‘moral spectacle’ – the gap between moral progress and pessimistic perceptions. His theories on moral outrage as a form of social status-seeking sparked a controversial but objective discussion.
In November, a lecture by the philosopher Philipp Hübl caused quite a stir; he analyses the ‘moral spectacle’ and published his findings in a book of the same name, a *Spiegel* bestseller, in 2024. In Darmstadt, the speaker skilfully began by highlighting all the areas in which things have improved in Germany – and which seem to contradict the general perception so starkly. For instance, he argued that discrimination against women, non-Germans and Muslims in the labour market is now barely detectable.
Such passages and others like them are not without controversy amongst the audience and can be explained primarily by the fact that Hübl takes a long-term view: He looks back over hundreds of years, not just the last 10 or 20. Phillip Hübl refers to the more day-to-day impression held by many people as the ‘moral paradox’: despite this progress, people believe that the state of the world has deteriorated and that people today are less moral than in the past. A fallacy which he attributes to selective media consumption, negative biases in public opinion, rising expectations (particularly in Western societies) and expanded definitions.
It was this last point in particular that sparked discussion amongst the 70 or so attendees at the Darmstadt University Tower, as Hübl spoke of ‘concept creep’ – the expansion of scientific concepts and terms that are being applied to oneself or transferred to others by an ever-increasing number of people. For him, such terms include ‘trauma’, ‘depression’, ‘addiction’, ‘violence’, ‘aggression’, ‘sexism’, ‘racism’ and others.
Hübl’s argument here is not that these phenomena do not exist (nor that even individual acts of violence should not be condemned, prevented or trivialised), but that in public debate they are sometimes accorded a significance that runs counter to their statistical importance.
And in light of this finding, Hübl asks what the reason for this might be, given that it is not down to a lack of empirical evidence – and provides his own answer. For him, it is because, in what he calls ‘discourses on justice’, morality serves as a kind of performative element within a status game. According to Hübl, certain terms and concepts are used to signal group affiliation and gain prestige; they are ‘weapons’ in the competitive struggle against other participants in the discourse.
Here, for example, he also identifies efforts to promote inclusive language, which he declares to be ‘exclusive’ (i.e. exclusionary) language, because it generates more resistance than inclusion and excludes a great many people (particularly non-academics). These and other arguments were the subject of heated and emotional debate.
Even during the announcement phase, several students and lecturers had already come forward, some opposing the lecture and others advocating for Hübl to be included in a panel discussion. Others argued in favour of allowing the lecture to go ahead. Overall, Hübl’s controversial arguments sparked an intense debate. There was a debate about the role of data and facts. It was conducted openly and respectfully, just as we would certainly hope for at a university.